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NOTES

GETTING TO “SOMETIMES” :
EXPANDING TEACHERS’ FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS THROUGH
“GARCETTI’S CAVEAT”
†

‡

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recognized that “education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments.”1 Public
schools2 must “inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary [for] the
maintenance of a democratic political system,”3 while also developing
“leaders . . . through wide exposure to [the] robust exchange of
ideas.”4 Even though the fulfillment of these aims is primarily the
province of state and local officials, public schools must not
contravene the Constitution in the service of their educational
missions.5 The Court’s “public schools jurisprudence”6 has
† Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The proper
answer to the question ‘whether the First Amendment protects a government employee from
discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties’ is ‘Sometimes,’ not
‘Never.’”) (internal citation omitted).
‡ Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 2010).
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2 This Note uses the term “school” to denote educational institutions of the primary and
secondary levels and “university” to represent those of higher learning. Similarly, for the
purposes of this Note, “teacher” refers to educators in schools, whereas “professor” identifies
their counterparts at universities.
3 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).
4 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 David Fellman, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT AND EDUCATION vii, vii–ix
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established that the First Amendment requires school officials to
accommodate some student speech in the process of educating the
nation’s youth.7 Beyond the Court’s 1968 declaration in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District that, like students,
“teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”8 however, the Court
has not provided school officials with any explicit guidance regarding
the extent to which they must tolerate teachers’ speech in the course
of their instructional duties.9
To determine whether the Constitution protects teachers’
classroom speech, then, the United States Courts of Appeals have
looked to one or more analogous First Amendment perspectives.10

(David Fellman ed., 1969).
6 James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1337
(2000).
7 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (requiring a
“legitimate pedagogical concern[ ]” for restrictions on “student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities”); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (permitting the
punishment of “offensively lewd and indecent speech” in schools); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514
(prohibiting school officials from disciplining students for their speech unless the speech could
cause “a substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities”). For a
discussion of these cases, see infra Part I.B.
8 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
9 See, e.g., Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir.
2001) (“Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has definitively resolved whether and to what
extent a teacher’s instructional speech is protected by the First Amendment.”). Compare EvansMarshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 229 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never
removed in-class speech from its presumptive place within the ambit of the First Amendment.”),
with id. at 235 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court has never held that the First
Amendment applies to a teacher's classroom speech.).
This Note refers to this type of teacher speech as “classroom speech.”
10 Most courts and commentators have treated the judicial approach to this issue as a
choice between two alternatives: the test for public-employee speech from the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983), and the test for school-sponsored student speech from Hazelwood. See, e.g.,
Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775–77 (10th Cir. 1991) (adopting the Hazelwood test
to determine whether the First Amendment protected a teacher’s classroom speech despite the
district court’s decision, and the parties’ arguments, that the Pickering-Connick test applied);
Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on
School Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 79–80 (2008) (noting the circuit split between
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which apply Pickering-Connick to First
Amendment retaliation cases involving teachers’ classroom speech, and the First, Second,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which apply Hazelwood).
At least one court has described the availability of three analytical options: PickeringConnick, Hazelwood, and the test for government speech from Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991), and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
See Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1448–49, 1449 n.6 (assuming arguendo that Hazelwood
applied to teachers’ use of languages other than English in the classroom instead of PickeringConnick or Rust-Rosenberger because, in the court’s opinion, “it appear[ed] to be more speechprotective than the two alternatives”); see also Evans-Marshall, 428 F.3d at 234–36 (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (recommending that the Sixth Circuit “re-examine its First Amendment
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First, courts have viewed teachers as public employees and, applying
the test that the Supreme Court first announced in Pickering v. Board
of Education11 and later refined in Connick v. Myers,12 have balanced
teachers’ interests in speaking as citizens on matters of public concern
against schools’ interests in their ability to provide an education for
their students.13 Second, courts have seen schools as nonpublic fora
with “special characteristics”14 and, under Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier,15 have looked for the legitimate pedagogical concerns
underlying schools’ restrictions on teachers’ classroom speech.16
Third, at least one court has considered identifying the school itself,
rather than the teacher, as the speaker, citing Rust v. Sullivan17 and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia18 for the
proposition that that school officials should have the ability to control
the content of the educational message that their students receive.19
jurisprudence in the context of in-class curricular speech” in light of the principles established in
Rust and Rosenberger); Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing
First Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37, 64 (2008) (referring to the
Fourth Circuit’s characterization of the Third Circuit’s use of Rust and Rosenberger to
determine the protection that the Constitution affords teachers’ classroom speech).
Courts and commentators have also found that the principle of academic freedom bears on
the question. See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452–53 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), for the Supreme Court’s discussion of the
importance of the precise speech regulations in light of teachers’ “vital First Amendment rights”
in that marketplace of ideas that is the classroom and concluding that schools must not only
have a legitimate pedagogical interest in restricting teachers’ classroom speech but also must
provide teachers with notice of prohibited speech); ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE
UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 204 (2009) (“The issue is also
complicated by the notion of academic freedom, which although not explicitly a part of the First
Amendment is nonetheless woven—often in a haphazard fashion—through analyses of an
educator’s right of expression.”); Anne Gardner, Note, Preparing Students for Democratic
Participation: Why Teacher Curricular Speech Should Sometimes Be Protected by the First
Amendment, 73 MO. L. REV. 213, 214 (2008) (“Among the circuit courts, teacher curricular
speech is governed by three competing doctrines: public employee speech, student speech, and
academic freedom.”).
This Note considers all four of these precedential lines as First Amendment perspectives
on the degree to which teachers’ classroom speech warrants constitutional protection.
11 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
12 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
13 See, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1055 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the First Amendment protected a teacher’s decision to invite a speaker to address
her class about the benefits of industrial hemp production).
14 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
15 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
16 See, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect a school board member’s guest
lecture that included “[d]epictions of bare-chested women”).
17 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
18 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
19 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 235–36 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J.
concurring) (outlining a new direction for the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence regarding the
protection that the First Amendment affords to teachers’ classroom speech); cf. Edwards v. Cal.
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Finally, courts have also regarded teachers as First Amendment
figures under Keyishian v. Board of Regents20 and have considered
the extent to which schools’ right to “fix the curriculum”21 must
accommodate teachers’ responsibility to expose students to the
marketplace of ideas.22
The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos23
“dramatically changed the [First Amendment] landscape”24 from the
first of these four perspectives. Instead of evaluating the nature of a
public employee’s speech and engaging in the “particularized
balancing”25 of the employee’s interest in that speech against the
public employer’s interest in the efficient provision of its services, the
Garcetti Court announced that the First Amendment offers no
protection for a public employee’s speech “made pursuant to . . . [that
employee’s] official responsibilities.”26 Because “[t]here is some
argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests,”27
however, the Court qualified the scope of its holding, suggesting that
the First Amendment may offer some protection to a public
employee’s speech related to “scholarship or teaching.”28
Despite “Garcetti’s caveat,”29 judicial responses to the decision in
the circuit courts have been no more sensitive to teachers’ First
Amendment rights in the classroom, but rather have, on the whole,
been more restrictive.30 As a result, it is not surprising that one

Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491–92 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a university, rather than a
tenured professor, was the speaker with regard to the content of a course on educational
technology).
20 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
21 Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
22 See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452–53 (1st Cir. 1993) (allowing school
officials to set the parameters of what teachers may communicate in the classroom, but requiring
that teachers receive notice of prohibited expression); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910
F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusing to “delineate the scope of academic freedom afforded
to teachers under the First Amendment,” but concluding that it does not “extend to [the choice
of] curriculum or classroom management techniques in contravention of school policy or
dictates”); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989)
(“Although, the concept of academic freedom has been recognized in our jurisprudence, the
doctrine has never conferred upon teachers the control of the public school curricula.”).
23 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
24 Doucette v. Minocqua Hazelhurst & Lake Tomahawk Joint Sch. Dist., No. 07–cv–292–
bbc, 2008 WL 2412988, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 12, 2008).
25 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).
26 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
27 Id. at 425.
28 Id.
29 Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 2010).
30 See, e.g., id. at 338–40 (holding that the First Amendment did not protect a high school
English teacher’s use of a novel that the school district had purchased for instructional
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commentator has suggested that “Garcetti may ultimately prove the
death knell for any meaningful First Amendment rights for [teachers’]
classroom related communications.”31 In light of the limited extent of
those rights before Garcetti, however, there is some consensus that
Garcetti’s “practical impact . . . may be minimal.”32
While others have noted that Garcetti may be a reason for mild
optimism,33 this Note argues that Garcetti represents the best
opportunity for the expansion of teachers’ First Amendment rights in
the classroom since Tinker’s pronouncement that respect for the
constitutional rights of students and teachers is a mandatory
component of the public school curriculum.34 Through an
examination of each of the four First Amendment perspectives on this
issue, Part I of this Note explains the scope of teachers’ rights to free
expression in the classroom before Garcetti. Part II then discusses the
Garcetti decision and the ways in which it has affected circuit courts’
views of teachers’ classroom speech. Analyzing the circuit courts’
pre- and post-Garcetti jurisprudence, Part III of this Note argues that
courts certainly could, and perhaps should, use Garcetti’s caveat to
treat teachers’ classroom speech in such way that respects teachers’
role as servants not only of the public schools, but also the First
Amendment.
I. TEACHERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE CLASSROOM
BEFORE GARCETTI
A. A Public Employee’s Right to Free Expression in the Classroom
Before Garcetti, one First Amendment perspective that circuit
courts used to determine whether the First Amendment protected a
teacher’s classroom speech adopted the Supreme Court’s public-

purposes); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 689 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that a high
school teacher’s posting of material with religious themes on a classroom bulletin board did not
warrant constitutional protection); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477,
478–80 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect an elementary
teacher’s statement regarding her participation in demonstrations against the war in Iraq during
a current-events lesson). For a discussion of these cases, see infra Part II.
31 Hutchens, supra note 10, at 62.
32 Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: The Impact of
Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209, 225 (2008); see
also Hutchens, supra note 10, at 62 (“[R]ecent years, with some exceptions, have already
witnessed a general judicial resistance to First Amendment rights for teachers.”).
33 See, e.g., DUPRE, supra note 10, at 226 (“The upshot is that after Garcetti, the extent of
First Amendment protection—if it exists at all—is still a matter of speculation until the Court
revisits the issue.”).
34 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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employee speech jurisprudence,35 rooted in Pickering v. Board of
Education36 and Connick v. Myers.37 In Pickering, the Supreme Court
held that school officials violated Marvin Pickering’s First
Amendment rights when they discharged Pickering from his teaching
position because of a letter that he sent to a local newspaper
criticizing the school board and, in the process, announced a new test
for evaluating whether a public employee’s speech enjoys
constitutional protection.38 The Court stated that “teachers may [not]
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters
of public interest in connection with the operation of the public
schools in which they work.”39 On the other hand, the Court
recognized that “the State has interests as an employer in regulating
the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general.”40 The Court, therefore, sought to find “a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”41 Because the Court found that Pickering’s criticism of
school officials did not “impede[] the teacher's proper performance of
his daily duties in the classroom or . . . interfere[] with the regular
operation of the schools generally,”42 it concluded that the school
board’s interest in restricting Pickering’s speech was no greater than
its interest in restricting the speech of an ordinary citizen and,
35 See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2005); Cockrel v.
Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001); Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d
1172 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989);
Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Gardner, supra note 10, at 220
(“Several appellate courts have applied the Pickering balancing test to teacher curricular
speech.”); Zachary Martin, Comment, Public School Teachers’ First Amendment Rights: In
Danger in the Wake of “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1195 (2008) (“When
dealing with the issue of whether a public school teacher’s speech is constitutionally protected,
several circuits have applied the rules established in Pickering and Connick.”).
36 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
37 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
38 Pickering, 391 U.S. 564–65, 568–70; see also, e.g., Robert M. O’Neil, Academic
Speech in the Post-Garcetti Environment, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (describing
Pickering as “profoundly redefin[ing] the expressive rights of public employees”); Susan P.
Stuart, Citizen Teacher: Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281,
1289 (2008) (describing Pickering’s place in “the pantheon of First Amendment
jurisprudence”).
39 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 572–73.

2012]

GETTING TO “SOMETIMES”

1211

consequently, that the board could not discipline Pickering for his
speech without violating the First Amendment.43
Thirteen years later, in Connick v. Myers,44 the Court clarified the
application of Pickering’s balancing test.45 In Connick, the Court held
that the First Amendment did not protect a questionnaire that Shelia
Myers, an assistant district attorney, distributed to her coworkers
seeking their opinions about the district attorney and the policies of
his office.46 The Court emphasized the importance of the “public
concern” dimension of the Pickering test and concluded that an
evaluation of a public employer’s interest in discharging an employee
because of that employee’s speech is only appropriate when the
speech “can[] be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community.”47 Considering,
then, the “content, form, and context” of Myers’s questionnaire,48 the
Court found that one of the questions touched a matter of public
concern because it sought information regarding any pressure that
Myers’s fellow attorneys may have felt to work on certain political
campaigns, which the Court had previously recognized as a “coercion
of belief in violation of fundamental constitutional rights”49 and
which was related to the “interest in this country that government
service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than
political service.”50 From this finding, the Court proceeded to balance
Myers’s limited interest in “an employee grievance concerning
internal office policy”51 against the district attorney’s reasonable
belief that the questionnaire would “disrupt the office, undermine his
authority, and destroy close working relationships,”52 concluding that
the district attorney’s interests were more significant and, therefore,
that Myers’s discharge did not violate the First Amendment.53
When circuit courts viewed teachers as public employees and
applied Pickering-Connick’s two-part test, teachers’ classroom speech
received very little First Amendment protection.54 The United States
Id.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
45 See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 10, at 82 (“The Court continued to elucidate its
approach [to public employees’ First Amendment rights] in [Connick].”).
46 Connick, 461 U.S. at 140–41, 154.
47 Id. at 146.
48 Id. at 147–8.
49 Id. at 149.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 154.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (holding that a high school drama teacher’s selection of a play for her students to
perform did not warrant First Amendment protection); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910
43
44

141

1212

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:4

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 1990 decision in Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Board of Education55 represents perhaps the firmest
judicial rejection of a public employee’s right to free expression in the
classroom.56 In Bradley, the Third Circuit held that school officials
did not violate Diane Murray’s First Amendment rights by prohibiting
her use of Learnball, a classroom management technique that brings
the excitement of sport into the classroom by engaging students in
competitive educational exercises for extrinsic rewards.57 Although it
noted that Pickering does afford teachers the possibility of a
constitutional safeguard for their speech, the court stated that this
protection did not extend to teachers’ expression in the classroom.58
The Third Circuit offered no rationale of its own to support this
conclusion,59 but cited Clark v. Holmes,60 a 1972 case in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a
professor’s emphasis on the subject of sex in a health survey course,
in violation of his supervisors’ direct instructions, failed, under

F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect a high school
teacher’s use of an instructional method over school officials’ objections); Kirkland v. Northside
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the First Amendment did not
protect a high school teacher’s use of a nonapproved supplemental reading list in his world
history course); Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 864–65 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the Constitution did not protect the encouragement that a high school journalism teacher gave to
his students to publish articles on controversial topics). But see Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ.,
428 F.3d 223, 231–32 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court’s grant of the school
district’s motion to dismiss was erroneous because the First Amendment might protect a high
school English teacher’s alleged use of curricular materials that the school district had
approved); Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1055 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the First Amendment protected a teacher’s selection of a speaker to address her class about
the benefits of industrial hemp production).
55 910 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1990).
56 See, e.g., Theresa J. Bryant, May We Teach Tolerance? Establishing the Parameters of
Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 599 (1999) (noting that, in
Bradley, the Third Circuit held that “a teacher’s in class speech was simply not protected by the
First Amendment”); Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First
Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 18 (2001) (“The Third Circuit . . . flatly stated [in Bradley] that
classroom speech receives no protection under Pickering.”); Kimberly Gee, Establishing a
Constitutional Standard that Protects Public School Teacher Classroom Expression, 38 J.L. &
EDUC. 409, 436 (2009) (“[Bradley] indicates that the Third Circuit appears unwilling to extend
any First Amendment protection to teacher expression that occurs inside the classroom.”).
57 Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1174–76. Murray also claimed that the school’s ban on Learnball
violated her right to academic freedom. Id. at 1175. For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part
I.D.
For more on Learnball, see generally LEARNBALL FOR DISCIPLINE, WORK, ATTENDANCE,
http://www.learnball.com (last visited June 1, 2012).
58 Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1176.
59 The court did, however, point to the fact that, at the time of its decision, “no court ha[d]
found that teachers’ First Amendment rights extend to choosing their own curriculum or
classroom management techniques in contravention of school policy or dictates.” Id.
60 Id. (citing Clark v. Holmes,474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)).
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Pickering, to warrant First Amendment protection.61 As in Clark,
Murray sought the right to use Learnball despite an express school
policy,62 but the Third Circuit did not limit its holding to those
circumstances where a teacher’s speech conflicts with an official
prohibition.63
Other circuit courts have offered more explanation for their
decisions to deny teachers’ classroom speech First Amendment
protection from the public-employee perspective, finding that such
speech did not satisfy Connick’s “matter of public concern”
requirement.64 In Kirkland v. Northside Independent School District,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
First Amendment did not protect Timothy Kirkland’s use of an
unapproved supplemental reading list in his world history course.65
“With little difficulty,”66 the Fifth Circuit found that Kirkland’s
reading list did not touch a matter of public concern because, if the
use of the list was a response to a censorial administrative approval
requirement as Kirkland claimed, he “never attended public meetings
to register his opposition to [the school’s] world history reading list
. . . [or] announced to colleagues, superiors, or the public that the
school-supplied list impinged on his right to speak freely.”67 The
court further emphasized that “most significantly, [Kirkland] never
afforded [the school] an opportunity to pass upon the merits of his
list” and that he could not “remain mute and thereafter self-servingly
label his conduct to be a matter of public concern.”68 Even though the
Kirkland court described its “matter of public concern” analysis as
“imprecise,”69 it eschewed any consideration of the importance of the
subject matter of the books on the reading list,70 framing the list’s use
Clark, 474 F.2d at 929–32.
Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1174.
63 See supra note 56.
64 See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en
banc); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989).
65 Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 795–96.
66 Id. at 800.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 799.
70 Id. at 798–99 (“[I]ssues do not rise to a level of ‘public concern’ by virtue of the
speaker’s interest in the subject matter; rather they achieve that protected status if the words or
conduct are conveyed by the teacher in his role as a citizen and not in his role as an employee of
the school district.”) The court supported this subject-matter exclusion by quoting the Supreme
Court’s statement in Connick that “[t]o presume that all matters which transpire within a
government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark . . . would plant
the seed of a constitutional case.” Id. at 799 n.11 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149
(1983)). See R. Weston Donehower, Note, Boring Lessons: Defining the Limits of a Teacher’s
First Amendment Right to Speak Through the Curriculum, 102 MICH. L. REV. 517, 523–24, 524
n.47 (2003) (citing Kirkland as an example of the analytical choice that some circuit courts
61
62
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instead as a protest against an approval requirement for supplemental
materials.71
Although the Fifth Circuit did not expressly state that Kirkland
prevented teachers’ classroom speech from qualifying as a “matter of
public concern” under any circumstances,72 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certainly interpreted the case in that
manner.73 In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,74 the
Fourth Circuit held that school officials did not violate the First
Amendment when they transferred Margaret Boring to another high
school due to her selection and production of the play
Independence.75 In finding that the play did not touch a matter of
public concern, the court disregarded the production’s themes of
“family life, divorce, motherhood, and illegitimacy.”76 Rather, the
court viewed Boring’s selection of Independence as an assertion of
her “right to participate in the makeup of the school curriculum”77 and
concluded that the conflict between Boring and her principal was
“nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute.”78 Although the
Fourth Circuit looked to Kirkland and found it to be
“indistinguishable” from the case before it,79 the court’s “matter of
public concern” analysis was quite different.80 Whereas the Kirkland

make to focus on the context of teachers’ speech, “including the speaker’s role, manner,
audience, and motive,” rather than the speech’s content).
71 Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800.
72 See, e.g., Daly, supra note 56, at 18 (speculating that “the Fifth Circuit’s analysis seems
to have been driven by an underlying belief that the teacher’s claims of censorship were an
unpersuasive attempt to ‘cloak his substandard job performance in [F]irst [A]mendment
protection’”) (quoting Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800); Gee, supra note 56, at 435 (noting that the
Kirkland court “limited its holding to situations where teachers refuse to implement curricula
approved by school administrators”). But see Erica R. Salkin, Caution in the Classroom: K–12
Teacher In-Class Speech, the Federal Courts, and Garcetti, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175, 184
(2010) (“The Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts have made a blanket determination that curricula
are not of public concern, as decisions regarding curricula have historically been in the hands of
administrators and school boards.”).
73 See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (“In a case on facts so near to those in the case at hand as to be indistinguishable, the Fifth
Circuit came to the conclusion we have just recited in [Kirkland].”).
74 136 F.3d 364, 366–67 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
75 Id. at 366–67, 371.
76 See id. at 378 (Motz, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 366 (majority opinion).
78 Id. at 368.
79 See supra note 73.
80 See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368–69; see also Alexander Wohl, Oiling the Schoolhouse
Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering with Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, Time for a New
Beginning, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1303 (2009) (“While it is certainly easier to justify the
restraint on teacher speech in Kirkland, in light of the generally understood rules on curricula
that the teacher failed to follow, other instances of legal analysis applying these principles are
less straight forward. Such was the case in [Boring].” The analyses in Boring and Kirkland are
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court did not deny that teachers’ classroom speech, under different
circumstances, could be a matter of public concern,81 Boring held that
such speech could never satisfy that requirement.82
A focus on the subject matter of a teacher’s classroom speech,83
which neither the Fourth nor Fifth Circuits chose to do,84 could, in
fact, usher teachers’ classroom speech past the “matter of public
concern” threshold.85 In Cockrel v. Shelby County School District,86
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the
First Amendment protected Donna Cockrel’s decision to invite
Woody Harrelson to give presentations to her fifth-grade class on the
environmental benefits of industrial hemp.87 The court looked to
Connick’s statement that “matters of public concern are those that can
‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community’”88 and found that “[t]here is no
question that the issue of industrial hemp is a matter of great political
and social concern to many citizens of Kentucky”89 so as to “clearly
come within the Supreme Court’s understanding of speech touching
matters of public concern.”90 The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the
Kirkland and Boring decisions, stating that “the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits have read the Supreme Court’s language [in Connick] too
broadly”91 because their interpretation of the “matter of public
concern” requirement would leave teachers’ speech without
constitutional protection “even if about an upcoming presidential
election or the importance of our Bill of Rights.”92 From there, the

identical, however, in their treatment of academic freedom. See infra Part I.D.
81 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Boring, 136 F.3d at 380 (Motz, J., dissenting); Gee, supra note 56, at 421 n.92
(“[Boring] declared that all teacher speech deemed ‘curricular’ is not a public concern.”).
83 See Salkin, supra note 72, at 184 (describing the Sixth Circuit’s “matter of public
concern” analysis as hinging upon “what the content of [the teacher’s] message might be”);
Donehower, supra note 70, at 523, 523 n.46 (citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cockrel as an
example of a lower court’s focus on the speech’s content in its “matter of public concern”
inquiry); Vanessa A. Wernicke, Note, Teachers’ Speech Rights in the Classroom: An Analysis
of Cockrel v. Shelby County School District, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2003) (“Rather
than focusing on the context in which the speech occurred, the court in Cockrel focused on the
content of the speech to determine it to be protected under the First Amendment.”).
84 See supra notes 69–71, 76–78 and accompanying text.
85 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2005); Cockrel v. Shelby
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001). For a discussion of the Evans-Marshall
decision, see infra Part I.C.
86 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001).
87 Id. at 1055.
88 Id. at 1050–51 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 136, 146 (1983)).
89 Id. at 1051.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1052.
92 Id. at 1051–52.
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court found that the principal’s prior approval of Harrelson’s visits
undermined what would otherwise have been the school’s legitimate
interest in preventing the disharmony in the workplace that resulted
from the community’s negative response to Harrelson and his
message.93
Even if Connick’s “matter of public concern” requirement did not
prevent a teacher’s speech from garnering First Amendment
protection, the interests of school officials in restricting the teacher’s
speech could outweigh the teacher’s interest in that speech.94 In
Nicholson v. Board of Education,95 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that school officials did not violate
Don Nicholson’s First Amendment rights when they dismissed him
from his position as a high school journalism teacher for disregarding
his principal’s instructions and encouraging students to publish
articles in the school newspaper on sensitive topics such as “minority
unrest in the local community, . . . police-student relations[,] and . . .
the school’s treatment of the [F]ifth [A]mendment rights of
students.”96 Citing the factors that the Pickering Court suggested
could tip the balance of interests in the employer’s favor,97 the court
found that Nicholson’s activities did not warrant First Amendment
protection because Nicholson’s refusal to comply with his principal’s
instructions undermined their working relationship and some factual
inaccuracies in the contentious articles upset his fellow teachers.98
B. A Teacher’s Right to Free Expression in a Forum with “Special
Characteristics”
In addition to determining the scope of teachers’ speech rights in
the classroom by framing teachers as public employees,99 circuit
courts also considered the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence specific to the public school environment.100 The
Id. at 1054.
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit
decided Nicholson before Connick and evaluated the teacher’s claim by applying the Pickering
balancing test without Connick’s “matter of public concern” inquiry. See id.
95 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982).
96 Id. at 861, 864–66.
97 These factors include damage to the relationships that the teacher has with supervisors
and coworkers, improper performance of the teacher’s regular duties, and interference with the
general operation of the school. Id. at 865 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569–
70, 572–73 (1968)).
98 Id. at 865–66.
99 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
100 See, e.g., Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001);
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor
Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448
93
94
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“famous trilogy”101 of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District,102 Bethel School District v. Fraser,103 and Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier,104 defined this perspective. In Tinker, Supreme
Court held that school officials violated the First Amendment rights
of a group of students by suspending them for wearing black
armbands to protest the war in Vietnam.105 The Court stated that that
“[n]either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”106 but also
that these rights must accommodate “the special characteristics of the
school environment.”107 To resolve the “problem [that] lies in the area
where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with
the rules of the school authorities,”108 who have “comprehensive
authority . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the schools,”109 the
Court prohibited school officials from restricting student speech in
schools unless such speech would “‘materially and substantially
interfer[e] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school’ [or] . . . collid[e] with the rights of others.”110
Anything less, according to the Court, would transform schools into
“enclaves of totalitarianism,”111 which, rather than “educating the
young for citizenship,”112 would “strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes.”113 Since the school officials made no showing that
any disturbance was likely to, or did in fact, occur, the Court held that
the school could not discipline the students for wearing the
armbands.114
From Tinker, the Court extended school officials’ authority to
restrict student speech because of its effects in Bethel School District

(1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991); Webster v. New
Lenox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990).
101 Mary Sue Backus, OMG! Missing the Teachable Moment and Undermining the Future
of the First Amendment—TISNF!, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 153, 166 (2009).
102 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
103 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
104 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
105 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
106 Id. at 506.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 507.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
111 Id. at 511.
112 Id. at 506 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 514.
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v. Fraser.115 In Fraser, the Court held that a school district did not
violate a high school student’s First Amendment rights by suspending
him for giving a lewd speech during a school assembly.116 As in
Tinker,117 the Court emphasized that the First Amendment does not
have its full force in the school setting.118 Furthermore, the Court
identified “habits and manners of civility”119 as a value “fundamental
. . . to the maintenance of a democratic political system”120 and,
accordingly, an educational objective.121 Because the Court defined
the scope of this value to encompass “tolerance of divergent [and
even unpopular] political and religious views”122 as well as “the
sensibilities of others”123 and lewd speech in schools threatened to
offend other impressionable students, it held that school officials
could restrict such speech without violating the First Amendment.124
Just two years after Fraser, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,125 the Supreme Court set a new constitutional standard for
“educators’ authority over [student expression in] school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”126 In Hazelwood, the
Court held that a high school principal’s decision to remove two
articles, one discussing pregnancy and the other dealing with divorce,
from the school newspaper did not violate student journalists’ First
Amendment rights.127 The Court found that the newspaper was not a
public forum because the school designated the newspaper to be “a
supervised learning experience for journalism students,”128 not a
platform for “’indiscriminate use’ by its student reporters and editors,
or by the student body generally.”129 Consequently, rather than
allowing school officials to restrict student speech that is not lewd or
indecent only when it threatened to cause a significant disruption or

115 478

U.S. 675 (1986).
at 685.
117 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
118 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
119 Id. at 681 (quotation omitted).
120 Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979)).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 684–85.
125 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
126 Id. at 271, 273.
127 Id. at 276.
128 Id. at 270.
129 Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983)).
116 Id.
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disturbance,130 the Court permitted educators to “control . . . the style
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”131 Under this test, the Court concluded that
the principal’s censorship of the articles was reasonable in light of the
risk that the articles posed for the invasion of the privacy of the
individuals that the stories described.132
Despite at least one court’s assessment that a focus on teachers’
speech in light of the special characteristics of the school environment
“appears to be more speech-protective” than viewing teachers as
public employees,133 before Garcetti no circuit court that adopted this
perspective found that the First Amendment protected a teacher’s
classroom speech.134 While no court adopted the Third Circuit’s
position in Bradley that teachers’ classroom speech was not eligible
for classroom protection under any circumstances,135 the judicial
sensitivity to the unique environment in schools resulted in the denial
of First Amendment protection for such speech for reasons that courts
did not consider from the public-employee perspective.136 For
instance, in Miles v. Denver Public Schools,137 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected John Miles’s claim
130 See

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
484 U.S. at 273.
132 Id. at 276.
133 See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001). It is
important to note that at the time of the Ninth Circuit’s statement, no circuit court had held a
teacher’s classroom speech warranted First Amendment protection under the public employee
perspective.
134 See, e.g., Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect teachers’ use of languages other than
English in the classroom); Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 734 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that school officials did not violate the First Amendment by terminating a
teacher for allowing her high school students to use profanity in their creative writing); Silano v.
Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
the First Amendment did not protect a school board member’s guest lecture that included
“[d]epictions of bare-chested women”); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 450, 452–53 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect a teacher’s discussion of aborting
fetuses with Down’s Syndrome in her ninth-grade biology class); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch.,
944 F.2d 773–74, 778–89 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a teacher’s comments on a rumor
regarding students’ sexual activity on the school’s tennis courts during his ninth-grade
government class did not warrant constitutional protection); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist.,
917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a school board’s prohibition on a high school
social studies teacher’s discussion of creationism in class did not violate the teacher’s First
Amendment rights).
135 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., Miles, 944 F.2d 773; Silano, 42 F.3d at 721, 724 (holding that a school
board’s censure of a guest lecturer’s presentation on the “persistence of vision phenomenon” to
a high school mathematics class that included images of topless women did not violate the
lecturer’s First Amendment rights, in part, because school officials had a legitimate interest in
“condemning [the lecturer’s] poor judgment”).
137 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
131 Hazelwood,
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that school officials violated his First Amendment rights by
reprimanding him for commenting on a rumor regarding students’
sexual activity on the school’s tennis courts during his ninth-grade
government class.138 Relying on Hazelwood, the court concluded that
the classroom was not a public forum and that a teacher’s classroom
speech “b[ore] the imprimatur of the school.”139 From there, the court
recognized that the school had a legitimate pedagogical interest in
“preventing [the teacher] from using his position of authority to
confirm an unsubstantiated rumor[,] . . . ensuring that teacher
employees exhibit professionalism and sound judgment[,] . . . [and]
providing an educational atmosphere where teachers do not make
statements about students that embarrass those students among their
peers.”140 Whereas the Ninth Circuit denied First Amendment
protection to the journalism teacher in Nicholson because of the
problems that his speech caused for the teacher’s relationship with his
principal and fellow teachers,141 the Tenth Circuit denied
constitutional protection to Miles’s speech because of its effects on
students and the community’s perception of the school.142
Just as teachers’ decisions to speak contrary to school policy
transformed their classroom speech into an “ordinary employment
dispute”143 under Pickering-Connick,144 Hazelwood’s “legitimate
public concern” standard did not yield First Amendment protection
for teachers’ classroom speech that violated school officials’
guidelines, although the judicial inquiry did involve at least some
consideration of the schools’ reasons for the speech restriction.145 In
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School District,146 for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Cecilia
Lacks’s termination for allowing her high school students to use
profanity in their creative writing did not violate the First
Amendment.147 Citing Fraser’s pronouncement that schools are
responsible for “teaching students the boundaries of socially
138 Id.

at 774–75, 778–79.
at 776.
140 Id. at 778.
141 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
142 Miles, 944 F.2d 773.
143 Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989).
144 See id. at 799.
145 See, e.g., Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998); see
also Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004, 1005–06, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a school board’s prohibition on a high school social studies teacher’s discussion of
creationism in class did not violate the teacher’s First Amendment rights because school
officials had an “important pedagogical interest in establishing the curriculum and legitimate
concern with possible establishment clause violations”).
146 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998).
147 Id. at 724.
139 Id.
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appropriate behavior,”148 the court found that the school board had a
legitimate pedagogical concern in its “flat prohibition on profanity in
the classroom.”149
Whereas the importance of the content of teachers’ classroom
speech earned it First Amendment protection in at least two cases
when courts treated teachers as public employees,150 the potential
significance of the subject matter of teachers’ speech did not even
enter the judicial calculus in determining what constituted a school’s
legitimate pedagogical concern.151 For instance, in Ward v. Hickey,152
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the
First Amendment did not protect Toby Klang Ward’s discussion of
aborting fetuses with Down’s Syndrome in her ninth-grade biology
class.153 Considering “educators[’ ability to] . . . limit the content of
school-sponsored speech as long as the limitations are ‘reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,’”154 the court reasoned
that the school’s decision not to renew Ward’s contract because of her
instructional choice was appropriate in light of the “age and
sophistication of [her] students.”155 Unlike the Sixth Circuit in
Cockrel,156 the court did not consider, and Ward did not argue, that
the political and social relevance of the topic made it appropriate for
discussion in class.157
C. A Teacher’s Right to Free Expression in the Classroom When the
School Speaks
The third First Amendment perspective that influenced at least one
court’s consideration of teachers’ First Amendment rights to free
expression in the classroom before Garcetti identifies the school
itself, or perhaps, more properly, school officials or the local board of
education, as the speaker rather than the teacher.158 This approach
148 Id.

(quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).

149 Id.
150 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2005); Cockrel v. Shelby
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001).
151 See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir 1993); see also Silano v. Sag Harbor
Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 721, 723 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a school
board’s censure of a guest lecturer’s presentation on the “persistence of vision phenomenon” to
a high school mathematics class that included images of topless women did not violate the
lecturer’s First Amendment rights, in part, because the use of the images themselves were
“unnecessary”).
152 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
153 Id. at 450.
154 Id. at 453 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)).
155 Id. at 453–54.
156 See supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text.
157 See Ward, 996 F.2d at 454.
158 See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ, 428 F.3d 223, 235 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J.,
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arose out of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rust v. Sullivan159 and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.160 In
Rust, the Court upheld a federal regulation that prohibited health care
providers who accepted federal funding for family-planning services
from offering any services that might lead to abortion, including
counseling and referrals.161 The Court emphasized that “the
government ‘may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds.”162 Further, the Court announced that “[t]he Government can,
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time, funding an alternative program which seeks
to deal with the problem in another way.”163 Because the regulations
were consistent with the purpose and scope of the federal grant, the
Court held that they did not violate the health care providers’ First
Amendment rights, noting that “[t]o hold that the Government
unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it
chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible
goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily
discourages alternative goals, would render numerous Government
programs constitutionally suspect.”164
The Supreme Court clarified Rust’s reach in Rosenberger v.
Rectors of Virginia.165 In Rosenberger, the Court held that the
University of Virginia violated the First Amendment rights of
students in a campus organization that published a magazine with a
Christian viewpoint by declining to authorize payment of the group’s

concurring) (“The school district bears responsibility for [a teacher’s classroom speech], and for
First Amendment purposes it therefore is the speaker and it therefore has the right to retain
control of the speech—or more precisely, to retain control over what is being taught in the
classroom.”); cf. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 74–75 (3d. Cir. 2001) (holding that a
university did not violate a professor’s First Amendment rights by changing one of the
professor’s assigned grades because “in the classroom, the university was the speaker and the
professor was he agent of the university for First Amendment purposes”); Edwards v. Cal. Univ.
of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 492 (3d. Cir. 1998) (holding that a university did not violate a professor’s
First Amendment rights by prescribing the curricular materials that he could use because “the
University was acting as a speaker and was entitled to make content-based choices”).
159 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
160 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
161 Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–94.
162 Id. at 192–93(quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
163 Id. at 193.
164 Id. at 194.
165 515 U.S. 819 (1995). See also Emily White Kirsch, Note, First Amendment Protection
of Teachers’ Instructional Speech: Extending Rust v. Sullivan to Ensure that Teachers Do Not
Distort the Government’s Message, 58 CLE. ST. L. REV. 185, 199 (2010) (describing
Rosenberger as “[o]ne of the most notable cases where Rust was applied”).
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printing bill from the university’s student activities fund.166 The Court
stated that “[w]hen the University determines the content of the
education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not
expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to
convey its own message.”167 The University’s restriction on the
distribution of student activities funds to student groups that espoused
a religious perspective, according to the Court, was impermissible
because it did not involve the university’s own speech or an attempt
to promote a message that university endorsed, but rather was an
instance of viewpoint discrimination against “private persons whose
speech it facilitate[d].”168
Although the choice to view schools as speakers through Rust and
Rosenberger did not command a majority of any circuit court before
Garcetti,169 at least one judge believed that courts should adopt this
First Amendment perspective and hold that teachers’ classroom
speech warrants no constitutional protection.170 In Evans-Marshall v.
Board of Education,171 the Sixth Circuit held that the First
Amendment protected Shelly Evans-Marshall’s use of the novels
Siddhartha, Fahrenheit 451, and To Kill a Mockingbird and the
movie Romeo + Juliet in her high school English class because the
“main themes of the work[s] . . . [such as] race and justice in the
American South . . . [are] matter[s] of public concern”172 and the
school board’s purchase and approval of the materials “undercut[] the
interest[] of [school officials] in controlling the workplace.”173 In a
concurring opinion, Judge Sutton agreed with the majority in that the
Sixth Circuit’s precedent, mostly notably Cockrel, compelled a
finding in favor of Evans-Marshall.174 On the other hand, Judge
166 Rosenberger,

515 U.S. at 825–27, 837.
at 833.
168 Id. at 834.
169 But cf. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 74–75 (3d. Cir. 2001) (holding that a university
did not violate a professor’s First Amendment rights by changing one of the professor’s
assigned grades because “in the classroom, the university was the speaker and the professor was
he agent of the university for First Amendment purposes”); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156
F.3d 488, 492 (3d. Cir. 1998) (holding that a university did not violate a professor’s First
Amendment rights by prescribing the curricular materials that he could use because “the
University was acting as a speaker and was entitled to make content-based choices”).
170 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 235 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (“The Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment applies to a
teacher’s classroom speech, and there is good reason to think that it would not do so.”).
171 428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2005).
172 Id. at 226–27, 231.
173 Id. at 231.
174 See id. at 234 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“Given our case law, the path that Judge Cole
has taken in resolving this dispute is the path that has been charted for us.”).
167 Id.
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Sutton suggested that “[w]hen Evans-Marshall asked her students to
read [To Kill a Mockingbird, Siddhartha, and Fahrenheit 451], it was
not her speech that was at issue but the school district’s.”175
According to Judge Sutton, “[t]he school district bears responsibility
for the speech, and for First Amendment purposes it therefore is the
speaker and it therefore has the right to retain control of the speech—
or, more precisely, to retain control over what is being taught in the
classroom.”176
D. A First Amendment Figure’s Right to Free Expression in the
Classroom
The final First Amendment perspective that circuit courts
considered prior to Garcetti in evaluating the degree to which the
Constitution protected teachers’ classroom speech framed teachers as
First Amendment figures.177 To determine the constitutional effects of
the Supreme Court’s treatment of academic freedom on teachers’
classroom speech, circuit courts looked primarily to Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,178 Keyishian v. Board of Regents,179 and Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.180 In Sweezy, a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that a professor’s conviction for contempt after
refusing to cooperate with the Attorney General’s investigation
pursuant to the New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act of 1951
violated the Due Process Clause.181 Though the plurality had high
praise for academic freedom,182 circuit courts took more guidance
from Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence,183 which declared that:
175 Id.
176 Id.

at 235.
e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en
banc); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452–53 (1st Cir. 1993); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of
Educ., 910 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.3d 794 (5th
Cir. 1989). But see Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991).
178 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion).
179 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
180 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
181 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 236–46, 254–55 (plurality opinion).
182 Id. at 250 (“The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that
true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”).
183 See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 237 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Miles v. Denver Pub.
Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J.,
177 See,
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It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation . . . [and] in which . . . prevail ‘the four essential
freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.184
Ten years after Sweezy, the Supreme Court’s decision in Keyishian
v. Board of Regents185 provided an “ardent tribute to academic
freedom . . . [that] validated the idea that [the value] was something
that courts and the Constitution must nurture.”186 In Keyishian, the
Court invalidated a New York law requiring loyalty oaths of all
employees in public higher education, finding the law to be
impermissibly vague.187 The court stated that “[o]ur Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned”188 and dubbed academic freedom “a special concern of the
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.”189 Unlike the Court’s praise for
academic freedom in Sweezy,190 which emphasized the importance of
a university’s independence, the Court’s rhetoric in Keyishian focused
on the value of recognizing teachers’ First Amendment rights.191
After Keyishian, the Court’s next significant endorsement of
academic freedom did not come until 1967192 in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.193 In Bakke, the Court held that the
special admissions program of the University of California at Davis’s
Medical School violated the Equal Protection Clause.194 Despite the
Court’s holding invalidating the admissions program, Justice Powell’s

concurring); see also JOAN DELFATTORE, KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING: ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 225 (2010) (“By far the most
significant reference to academic freedom in Sweezy appears in Frankfurter’s concurrence.”).
184 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting CONFERENCE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN & UNIV. OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN
UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–11 (Witwatersrand University Press 1957)).
185 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
186 DUPRE, supra note 10, at 219.
187 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 595–96, 603–04.
188 Id. at 603
189 Id.
190 See supra notes 174, 176 and accompanying text.
191 E.g., JOAN DELFATTORE, KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 225 (2010).
192 See DUPRE, supra note 10, at 221 (noting the waning of the Court’s concern for
academic freedom after the Red Scare).
193 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
194 Id. at 271 (opinion of Powell, J.)
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opinion, relying on both Sweezy and Keyishian, recognized that
“[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the
First Amendment.”195 This “constitutional interest[],”196 according to
Justice Powell, made the university’s aim of admitting those students
who would “contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas’”197
a “goal that is of paramount importance.”198
Though the Supreme Court’s decisions have left contours of
academic freedom uncertain,199 only one circuit court before Garcetti
expressly denied the possibility that this “special concern of the First
Amendment”200 includes teachers’ classroom speech within its
scope.201 In Miles, the Tenth Circuit rejected the teacher’s argument
that school officials violated his “[F]irst [A]mendment academic
freedom rights.”202 Citing Bakke, the court noted that “[t]he Supreme
Court has recognized a university’s institutional right to academic
freedom,”203 but stated that it could not find enough precedential
support for extending this right to an individual teacher.204 Even so,
the Tenth Circuit noted that the school district’s restriction on the
teacher’s classroom speech “simply [did] not threaten to ‘cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom.’”205
Most circuit courts acknowledged that teachers’ classroom speech
implicates academic freedom, but this recognition rarely affected the
ability of school officials to restrict such speech from either the
public-employee or school-environment perspective.206 In Bradley,
Boring, and Kirkland, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits,
195 Id.

at 312.
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
197 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (opinion of Powell, J.)
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., ERIC B ARENDT, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW 174 (2010) (“It is . . . not
entirely clear whether . . . constitutional [academic] freedom is concerned solely with the
institutional autonomy of universities or whether it also protects, in some contexts, individual
professors and teachers.”); DUPRE, supra note 10, at 206 (“Scholars and commentators have
written volumes about the contours (or lack thereof) of the elusive concept of academic
freedom, in confusing and overwhelming variety.”).
200 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (opinion of Powell, J.).
201 See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991); accord. EvansMarshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 228, 237–38 (Sutton, J., concurring) (suggesting that a
recognition of teachers’ academic freedom “risks transforming many employment disputes into
First Amendment retaliation claims”). For a discussion of the Miles case, see supra notes 137–
42 and accompanying text.
202 Miles, 944 F.2d at 779.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
206 But see Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 228, 237–38 (Sutton, J., concurring)
(suggesting that a recognition of teachers’ academic freedom “risks transforming many
employment disputes into First Amendment retaliation claims”).
196 Garcetti
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respectively, noted that Keyishian’s notion of academic freedom
provided some degree of First Amendment protection for teachers,
but stated that it did not grant teachers the right to contravene the
official curriculum.207 The First Circuit’s decision in Ward represents
perhaps the most influence that supplemental focus on teachers as
First Amendment figures had on teachers’ rights to free expression in
the classroom.208 While permitting school officials to restrict teachers’
classroom speech, due to the unique environment in schools, out of
any legitimate pedagogical concern, the Ward court, in light of
Keyishian, required schools to provide teachers with notice of official
restrictions on such speech.209
II. GARCETTI AND ITS EFFECTS ON TEACHERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS IN THE CLASSROOM
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,210 the Supreme Court rejected the First
Amendment retaliation claim of Richard Ceballos, a deputy district
attorney, and, in the process, shifted its public employee speech
jurisprudence so as to create a “categorical exclusion . . . [for] First
Amendment protection against official retaliation for things said on
the job.”211 Ceballos’s claim stemmed from his investigation of a
defense attorney’s complaint regarding misrepresentations in an
affidavit that police used to obtain a search warrant.212 Finding that
the affidavit contained certain inaccuracies, Ceballos informed his
supervisors and prepared a disposition memorandum recommending
207 See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 369 (4th. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (quoting Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989))
(“Although, the concept of academic freedom has been recognized in our jurisprudence, the
doctrine has never conferred upon teachers the control of public school curricula.”); Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d. Cir. 1990) (“In this case we do not delineate
the scope of academic freedom afforded to teachers under the First Amendment rights. . . .
However, no court has found that teachers' First Amendment rights extend to choosing their
own curriculum or classroom management techniques in contravention of school policy or
dictates.”); Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800–02 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Although the concept of academic
freedom has been recognized by our jurisprudence, the doctrine has never conferred upon
teachers the control of public school curricula. . . . Our decision should not be misconstrued as
suggesting that a teacher’s creativity is incompatible with the [F]irst [A]mendment, nor is it
intended to suggest that public school teachers foster free debate in their classrooms only at their
own risk or that their classrooms must be ‘cast with a pall of orthodoxy’”).
208 See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st. Cir. 1993). For a discussion of this case,
see supra notes 152–57 and accompanying text.
209 Ward, 996 F2d at 452. Cf. Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718,
723 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Ward’s notice requirement to evaluate whether the First
Amendment protected a teacher’s classroom speech and noting that it was “satisfied that [the
teacher] was provided with enough notice by the school board that profanity was not to be
allowed in her classroom” without expressly adopting the requirement).
210 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
211 Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 413–14 (majority opinion).
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the dismissal of the case.213 Despite Ceballos’s recommendation, the
case continued and the defense attorney called Ceballos to testify
about the affidavit.214 After this series of events, Ceballos claimed
that his supervisors retaliated against him by reassigning him to a
different position, transferring him to another courthouse, and
denying him a promotion.215
In determining that the First Amendment did not protect
Ceballos’s speech, the Court emphasized the importance of a public
employer’s ability to control the words and actions of its employees
in order to ensure “the efficient provision of public services,”216
holding that “when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate
their communication from employer discipline.”217 As a result of
Garcetti, a public employee’s speech must be not “pursuant to [that
employee’s] official duties”218 and on a matter of public concern in
order to be eligible for First Amendment protection.219
Justice Souter dissented from the majority’s opinion, expressing
his concerns that the categorical exclusion from First Amendment
protection of public employees’ speech in the course of their
employment duties could “imperil . . . academic freedom in public
colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write
‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”220 The majority was careful to
acknowledge Justice Souter’s concern, stating that “[t]here is some
argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests.”221
In light of this recognition, the Court made it clear that Garcetti’s
application to “a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching” was uncertain.222
Despite Garcetti’s caveat, in Mayer v. Monroe County Community
School Corporation,223 the first post-Garcetti case involving a
teacher’s classroom speech to reach a circuit court,224 the Seventh
213 Id.

at 414.
at 414–15.
215 Id. at 415.
216 Id. at 418.
217 Id. at 421.
218 Id.
219 Id. It must also, of course, survive Pickering’s balancing inquiry in order to receive
constitutional protection. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
220 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (Souter, J. dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
221 Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
222 Id.
223 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007).
224 See, e.g., McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 32, at 224; Waldman, supra note 10, at 85.
214 Id.
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Circuit applied Garcetti to deny the teacher’s expression
constitutional protection. The court held that school officials did not
violate Deborah Mayer’s First Amendment rights by terminating her
for telling her elementary school students about her participation in
political demonstrations against the war in Iraq during a currentevents lesson.225 Because the teacher conceded that the lesson was
part of her official duties, the court stated that “if Garcetti supplies
the rule of decision, then the school district prevails without further
ado.”226 The court also dismissed the teacher’s argument that
academic freedom exempted her speech from Garcetti’s reach,
finding that “[c]hildren who attend school because they must ought
not be subject to teachers’ idiosyncratic perspectives”227 but noting
that “[h]ow much room is left for constitutional protection of
scholarly viewpoints in post-secondary education was left open in
Garcetti . . . and need not be resolved today.”228
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit accepted the
Supreme Court’s invitation to refrain from applying Garcetti to a case
involving classroom speech when it faced the issue in Lee v. York
County School Division.229 In Lee, the court held that the First
Amendment did not protect the materials with religious themes that
William Lee posted on a bulletin board in his high school Spanish
classroom.230 The court analyzed Lee’s claim from the publicemployee perspective, but decided not to apply Garcetti because
“[t]he [Supreme] Court explicitly did not decide whether this analysis
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to
teaching.”231 Under a Pickering-Connick analysis, then, following the
path that its Boring decision established,232 once the Fourth Circuit
determined that the teacher’s speech was “curricular in nature”233
because the bulletin board materials “[bore] the imprimatur of . . . [the
school] and . . . were designed to impart particular knowledge to the
students,”234 the court’s conclusion that Lee’s complaint not a matter
of public concern and, therefore, “nothing more than an ordinary
employment dispute” followed.235
225 Mayer,
226 Id.

474 F.3d at 480.
at 479.

227 Id.
228 Id.

at 480.
F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007).
230 Id. at 700.
231 Id. at 694 n.11.
232 See supra text accompanying notes 72–81.
233 Lee, 484 F.3d at 697.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 700.
229 484
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Whereas the teachers in Lee and Mayer may not have lost First
Amendment protection for their speech as a result of the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits’ responses to Garcetti,236 the teacher at the center of
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Evans-Marshall v. Board of
Education237 certainly did.238 In Evans-Marshall, Shelly EvansMarshall appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the school board and its finding that the First Amendment did
not protect her use of the novel Siddhartha in her high school English
class.239 The court followed its Cockrel decision in determining that
the teacher’s speech touched a matter of public concern because the
novel’s topic was “‘of . . . concern to the community.’”240 Further, the
court pointed to the school board’s purchase of Siddhartha as a factor
that tipped the Pickering balancing inquiry in Evans-Marshall’s
favor.241 Notwithstanding these findings, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that Garcetti made them “beside the point.”242 Rejecting the teacher’s
argument that Garcetti should not apply, the court looked to Justice
Souter’s dissent in limiting the scope of Garcetti’s caveat to teachers
at public colleges and universities.243 For the Sixth Circuit, “[t]he
concept of ‘academic freedom’ . . . does not readily apply to in-class
curricular speech at the high school level”244 because “[a]s a cultural
and a legal principle, academic freedom ‘was conceived and
implemented in the university’ out of concern for ‘teachers who are
also researchers or scholars—work not generally expected of
elementary and secondary school teachers.’”245

236 The Fourth Circuit’s response to Garcetti involved the same approach that the court
used prior to Garcetti: Boring’s categorical denial of constitutional protection to teachers’
classroom speech. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Before Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit used Hazelwood to evaluate the constitutional
protection that teachers’ classroom speech warranted. See Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist.,
917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990); Gee, supra note 56, at 438–39. This approach has not yet granted
teachers’ classroom speech First Amendment protection in any circuit court. See supra notes
133–34 and accompanying text.
237 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010).
238 See id. at 338–40.
239 Id. at 335–37. For a discussion of this case in the Sixth Circuit on the school district’s
appeal of the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss, see supra notes 169–76 and
accompanying text.
240 Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d. at 338 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146
(1983)).
241 Id. at 339–40.
242 Id. at 340.
243 Id. at 343.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 343–44 (quoting J. Peter Bryne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the
First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 288 n.137 (1989)).
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III. THE PROMISE OF GARCETTI’S CAVEAT
Garcetti suggests that viewing teachers as public employees is the
proper First Amendment perspective from which to begin an analysis
of the protection that the First Amendment affords teachers’
classroom speech.246 Despite the obvious circuit split between those
courts approaching this issue from the public-employee perspective
and those adopting the school-environment perspective,247 not a single
justice in Garcetti intimated that Hazelwood provided the more
appropriate legal standard for teachers’ classroom speech.248 It may
be fair to read Justice Souter’s concern that Garcetti would leave “the
teaching of a public university professor”249 well “beyond the pale of
the First Amendment”250 to signal nothing more the appropriateness
of treating professors’ First Amendment retaliation claims through the
public-employee framework. The majority’s response, however, that
“[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s
customary employee-speech jurisprudence”251 suggests, at least on its
face, that the public-employee perspective is the most suitable lens
through which to evaluate the First Amendment claims of professors
and teachers alike.252
In the few cases involving teachers’ First Amendment rights in the
classroom that have reached the circuit courts since Garcetti, it is
clear that courts have received this signal.253 The most significant
judicial recognition of Garcetti’s endorsement of the public-employee
perspective came in Mayer.254 Rather than searching for the legitimate
pedagogical concern behind the school district’s restriction on the
teacher’s speech as it did in Webster v. New Lenox School District,255
246 But cf. Salkin, supra note 72, at 199 (“Based on the few cases that have been settled,
however, it is fair to say that the split between those circuits that endorse the Pickering-Connick
standard for such speech and those that apply Hazelwood is not only far from resolved, but
further fractured by the addition of those who embrace Garcetti.”)
247 See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 10, at 79–80.
248 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
249 Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
250 Id.
251 Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
252 Cf. DUPRE, supra note 10, at 226. (“Thus the Court suggested that educators may have
more First Amendment protection for on-the-job speech than other government employees.”).
253 See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (2007); cf. Panse v.
Eastwood, 303 F. App’x. 933, 935 (2d Cir. 2008) (deciding not to reject Garcetti in favor of
Hazelwood, but rather holding that a teacher’s classroom speech would fail to warrant First
Amendment protection under either standard).
254 See, e.g., Gee, supra note 56, at 438–39 (noting that the Seventh Circuit applied
Garcetti in Mayer “[w]ithout mentioning that it had applied Hazelwood in the past”).
255 917 F.2d 1004, 1005–06, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a school board’s
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the Seventh Circuit simply stated that Garcetti compelled the finding
that the teacher’s classroom speech warranted no constitutional
protection.256 The court did cite Webster for the proposition teachers
“[do] not have a constitutional right to introduce [their] own views on
the subject but must stick to the prescribed curriculum—not only the
prescribed subject matter, but also the prescribed perspective on that
subject matter,”257 but did so as part of its reasoning for rejecting
Mayer’s argument that the principles of academic freedom should
exempt her from Garcetti’s conclusion.258
The Seventh Circuit’s shift is significant because, if there are
grounds to make an exception for teachers’ classroom speech under
Garcetti’s caveat, then the public-employee perspective holds more
potential for such speech to receive First Amendment protection than
either a judicial focus on the special school environment or the
message that the school district seeks to convey.259 Even though
teachers have failed to pass both Connick’s “matter of public
concern” threshold and Pickering’s balancing inquiry in their
attempts to gain constitutional protection for their classroom
speech,260 viewing teachers as public employees is the only First
Amendment perspective that has led to constitutional protection for
teachers’ classroom speech.261 A focus on the school environment has
led courts to find that schools have a legitimate pedagogical concern
in restricting teachers’ speech for a number of reasons,262 even if the
speech does no more than reflect the teacher’s “poor judgment.”263
Furthermore, if a court views the schools, rather than teachers, as
speakers, then schools can restrict teachers’ speech for no reason
other than their disagreement with its message.264
Of course, after Garcetti, determining whether the First
Amendment protects teachers’ classroom speech from the publicemployee perspective only matters if courts also recognize that
teachers are First Amendment figures. Garcetti’s caveat owes its

prohibition on a high school social studies teacher’s discussion of creationism in class did not
violate the teacher’s First Amendment rights because school officials had an “important
pedagogical interest in establishing the curriculum and legitimate concern with possible
establishment clause violations”).
256 Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479.
257 Id.
258 See id.
259 See supra Parts I.A–C.
260 See supra Part I.A.
261 See supra Part I.
262 See supra Part I.B.
263 See supra note 136.
264 See supra Part I.C.
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existence to the “constitutional interests”265 associated with academic
freedom.266 If teachers have no stake in academic freedom, therefore,
Garcetti should apply, and courts should deny First Amendment
protection to teachers’ classroom speech as succinctly as the Seventh
Circuit did in Mayer.267 While it is possible that the Supreme Court
was only hesitant to apply Garcetti to “case[s] involving speech
related to scholarship or teaching” in the university environment,268
the majority’s language does not compel this conclusion.269
Furthermore, most circuit courts that have addressed this issue have
suggested that teachers have some interest in academic freedom.270
Even though academic freedom’s application to teachers may be
uncertain,271 Garcetti’s context—a dispute between an employer and
an employee—makes it clear that the Supreme Court does not
consider academic freedom to be a constitutional value that only
universities enjoy.272 The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Evans-Marshall
demonstrates that at least one circuit court has misunderstood this
message.273 After applying Garcetti and finding that the First
Amendment did not protect the teacher’s speech,274 the EvansMarshall court added that the teacher could not “sidestep”275 Garcetti
by invoking academic freedom because “[t]he concept of ‘academic
freedom’ . . . does not readily apply to in-class curricular speech at
the high school level.”276 If the Sixth Circuit had stopped here, its
conclusion would be consistent with one reading of Garcetti’s caveat,
but the court went on to state that “‘it is the educational institution
that has a right to academic freedom, not the individual teacher.’”277
265 Garcetti

v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
id.
267 See supra notes 225–26 and accompanying text.
268 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
269 See id.; see also Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:03cv091, 2008 WL 2987174, at
*8 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2008) (“It is important to note that while Justice Souter’s concern were
specifically directed to the university setting (focusing on the teachings of ‘public university
professors’ and academic freedoms found in ‘public colleges and universities’), the majority’s
language is far broader in that it pertains to ‘speech related to scholarship or teaching.’”)
270 See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.
271 See supra note 199.
272 In arguing for an institutional conception of academic freedom, J. Peter Byrne has
criticized commentators for suggesting that the Supreme Court’s academic freedom
jurisprudence “would eventually provide extensive protection for the academic judgments of
individual faculty against interference by university administrators.” J. Peter Byrne, Academic
Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” YALE L.J. 251, 301 (1989). This,
however, is the only context in which academic freedom would provide grounds for exempting
professors and teachers from Garcetti.
273 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010).
274 See supra notes 239–45 and accompanying text.
275 Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 343.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 344 (quoting Borden v. Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 153, 172 n.14 (3d Cir. 2008)).
266 See
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This statement fundamentally misconstrues the role of academic
freedom in Garcetti.278 While the Sixth Circuit may be correct in
noting that, ultimately, academic freedom does not “insulate a
teacher’s curricular and pedagogical choices from the school board’s
oversight,”279 Garcetti suggests that it is, in fact, an individual right to
some degree.280
The Fourth Circuit has also failed to recognize the significance of
academic freedom in Garcetti.281 In Lee, the court chose not to apply
Garcetti because “[t]he [Supreme] Court explicitly did not decide
whether [its] analysis would apply in the same manner to a case
involving speech related to teaching.”282 The Lee court did not,
however, cite academic freedom as the reason for this decision.283
Since the Supreme Court couched Garcetti’s caveat in the principle of
academic freedom,284 the Fourth Circuit should have conditioned its
disregard of Garcetii on the recognition of that constitutional value. It
is possible, however, that the Fourth Circuit, in relying on its decision
in Boring for guidance in evaluating a teacher’s classroom speech
from the public-employee perspective,285 impliedly acknowledged
that academic freedom offered some degree of constitutional
protection for teachers’ speech.286 Even if the court impliedly
recognized that teachers are First Amendment figures, however, the
court failed to consider how academic freedom would affect the
Pickering-Connick calculus.287
The role of academic freedom in the Pickering-Connick analysis is
an issue that circuit courts have not addressed when determining the
protection that the Constitution affords teachers’ classroom speech
after Garcetti,288 but one that Garcetti raises. Prior to Garcetti, courts
that viewed teachers as public employees did not factor academic
freedom into their Pickering-Connick analyses.289 This may have been
appropriate, but Garcetti indicates that this “constitutional
interest[]”290 could affect the public-employee speech analysis
278 See

supra note 272 and accompanying text.
624 F.3d at 344.
280 See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
281 See Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007).
282 Id. at 694 n.11.
283 See id.
284 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
285 See Lee, 484 F.3d at 696–700.
286 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
287 See Lee, 484 F.3d 687.
288 See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. Of Educ., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010); Panse v.
Eastwood, 303 F. App’x. 933, 935 (2d Cir. 2008); Lee, 484 F.3d 687; Mayer v. Monroe Cnty.
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007).
289 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
290 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
279 Evans-Marshall,
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directly.291 If circuit courts choose to exempt teachers’ classroom
speech through Garcetti’s caveat and apply Pickering-Connick to
determine whether such speech warrants First Amendment protection,
not only should they recognize that academic freedom is the basis for
doing so, but courts should also consider it as part of the “content,
form, and context”292 of teachers’ speech for purposes of Connick’s
“matter of public concern” threshold. Some courts have refused to
recognize the content of teachers’ classroom speech for this purpose,
focusing instead on the rights that teachers assert through their
speech.293 Garcetti provides a reason to add academic freedom to the
rights that teachers may assert through their classroom speech.294 The
effect of such an acknowledgement may make teachers’ classroom
speech a matter of public concern per se, but if a per se rule against
such speech existed prior to Garcetti,295 there seems to be no reason
why one cannot exist in its favor in light of Garcetti’s caveat.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to deny that circuit courts, on the whole, have not
afforded teachers’ classroom speech First Amendment protection.296
Furthermore, before Garcetti the Supreme Court was not particularly
interested in resolving the circuit split regarding the appropriate
constitutional standard to apply to the issue,297 and the Court has been
no more receptive to petitions for writ of certiorari involving
teachers’ classroom speech after Garcetti.298 Despite this, Garcetti’s
caveat provides an avenue for lower courts to find that the
Constitution protects teachers’ classroom speech.299 If circuit courts
have not denied that the principle of academic freedom may apply to
teachers,300 then they have grounds to avoid Garcetti’s categorical
conclusion and apply the Pickering-Connick test to determine
291 See

id.

292 Connick

v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (describing the teacher’s speech as an expression of a “right to participate in the
makeup of the school curriculum”).
294 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
295 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
296 See supra Part I.
297 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Cockrel, 537 U.S. 8113 (2002); Lacks v. FergusonFlorissant Reorganized Sch. Dist., 526 U.S. 1012 (1999); Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 525 U.S. 813 (1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 515 U.S.
1160 (1995); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 496 U.S. 926 (1990).
298 See Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 552 U.S. 950 (2007); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 552 U.S. 823 (2007).
299 See supra Part III.
300 See supra notes 206–09 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 199–205 and
accompanying text.
293 See,
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whether teachers’ classroom speech warrants First Amendment
protection.301 Considering a teacher’s right to academic freedom in
the Pickering-Connick analysis would increase teachers’ odds of
making it past Connick’s “matter of public concern” threshold. While
this would likely result in greater First Amendment protection for
teachers’ classroom speech, Pickering’s balancing inquiry would
ensure that schools are still able to “inculcat[e] fundamental values
necessary [for] the maintenance of a democratic political system”302
without preventing teachers from contributing to the development of
“leaders . . . through wide exposure to [the] robust exchange of
ideas.”303
BENJAMIN C. GALEAΨ

301 Cf. Lee v York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694–95, 695 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007)
(applying Pickering-Connick to determine whether the Constitution protected a teacher’s
classroom speech instead of Garcetti without any acknowledgement of the teacher’s academic
freedom).
302 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).
303 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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